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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, cases arising at the interface between 
intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) and antitrust/competition law 
(“the Interface”) seem invariably related to subject matter which 
pre-existing IPRs have expanded to encompass.1  These have 
sprung from technological advances, as well as the purported need 
to preserve the ability of owners to take advantage of their 
investments, and thereby their incentives to innovate for the benefit 
of society.2  The growth of IPRs has occurred despite doubts that 
have been raised as to the force of these justifications fuelling its 
growth.3  As IPRs are strengthened, lengthened, and expanded over 
new categories of works, a concern arises that intellectual property 
(“IP”) owners have an unprecedented ability to distort competition 
in the marketplace.4  At the heart of the Interface arguably lies the 
issue of refusals to license.5 
 
 1 These cases include IPRs over databases and software. See United States v. 
Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Attheraces Ltd. v. British Horseracing Bd., 
[2007] EWCA (Civ) 38 (Eng.) (horseracing data); Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann 
v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743 (television program schedules); Case C-418/01, IMS 
Health GmbH v. NDC Health GmbH, [2004] E.C.R. I-5039 (German pharmaceutical 
market data); Case T-201/04, Comm’n v. Microsoft, 2004 E.C.R. II-4463. 
 2 It has been argued that digitization and the Internet allowed instantaneous perfect 
replication.  IPRs therefore had to grow. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 
(2001).  In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the Copyright Act to cover a form of 
liability it had never before recognized in the context of copyright—providing technology 
that induces copyright infringement. MGM Studios v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913, 940 
n.13 (2005) (ruling against Grokster’s peer-to-peer file sharing program). 
 3 See DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS 
COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 179 (Portfolio 2006).  In the case of software, 
product life-cycles have historically been somewhere between 5 and 15 years.  Still, 
copyright protection of computer programs follows today the same terms as those of any 
artistic work and is currently multiple times over product lifetimes. YALE M. BRAUNSTEIN 
ET AL., Economics of Property Rights as Applied to Computer Software and Data Bases, 
in TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT 231, 241–42 & n.11 (George P. Bush et al. eds., 1979) 
(questioning whether efficiency gains would outweigh administrative costs of multiple 
protection terms in copyright legislation).  Recently, leading U.S. economists published a 
well-argued note in a legal case challenging the copyright term extension in the United 
States from 50 to 70 years. See, e.g., Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372 (2003), available at 
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/economists.pdf. 
 4 The Directorate-General for Competition recognizes that “[t]he impact of intellectual 
property rights on expansion and entry depends on the nature and actual strength of the 
intellectual property right held by the allegedly dominant undertaking.” DG Competition 
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Anticompetitive abuses involving refusals to supply licenses 
may occur when the dominant undertaking denies an actual or 
potential licensee access to an input to exclude it from participating 
in an economic activity.6  IPRs are legal barriers and may limit the 
number of market participants.  Foreclosure may be of concern to 
competition law when efficient rivals are discouraged from entry 
or encouraged to exit.7  The ability for IP owners to do so stems 
from their market power, typically characterized by sustained high 
levels of market shares,8 as well as barriers to entry and expansion 
faced by competitors.  Antitrust authorities look at whether the 
latter would have been sufficiently immediate and persistent to 
prevent the abuse of market power.9  This area is highly 
contentious because in some cases, antitrust/competition policy 
requires dominant undertakings to grant competitors access to 
valuable IPRs in order to ensure that effective competition is 
maintained.10  This raises the question of whether and how 
 
Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses, 
at 13 (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/ 
discpaper2005.pdf [hereinafter DG Competition Paper]. 
 5 Refusals to license generally occur where a company that has exclusive control over 
a scarce resource owns access that is indispensable to compete in the same market or 
closely related market.  The undertaking takes advantage of such a strategic position and 
employs it in order to preserve or strengthen its dominant position in that market or to 
acquire it in the second-related market. 
 6 Refusals to supply can take several forms. It can be a simple refusal (halting existing 
supplies or refusing to deal) or a constructive refusal (pricing so that it becomes 
economically unviable for the buyer to continue its activities, calculated delays in 
supplying, exclusive dealing or tying arrangements). It can also be horizontal (where the 
dominant undertaking attempts to exclude a rival at its own level in the supply chain) or 
vertical (where the dominant undertaking attempts to exclude a active or potential 
participant in a downstream market). 
 7 That is not to say that any time an efficient rival is discouraged from entry or 
encouraged to exist there is a foreclosure and/or an abuse because of IPR.  However, it is 
a weighty factor affecting the conclusion of the analysis. 
 8 See Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market, 1997 O.J. (C 372) 
paras. 54–55. 
 9 E.U. authorities recognize that this assessment depends on the characteristics and 
dynamics of the market—factors such as capacity constraints, the history of frequent and 
successful entry and entry costs. DG Competition Paper, supra note 4, at 13–14. 
 10 An additional explanation for this conflict stems from competition law’s focus on 
attaining competitive market conditions not particular outcomes, as opposed to 
intellectual property law’s preoccupation with ensuring the optimum amount of 
innovation.  Competition law assumes that deterring monopolies will lead to the 
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antitrust/competition law can be used to counterbalance 
informational bottlenecks that could become a form of abuse.11  
There is a need for clear and economically robust rules to regulate 
the amorphous boundaries of innovation. 
United States jurisprudence has a long history of examining 
such issues in sectors involving IPRs as well as more traditional 
infrastructure.12  It has settled on a deferential approach.  In the 
absence of immediate consumer harm, antitrust law is reluctant to 
 
attainment of economic efficiency, while intellectual property law assumes that 
efficiency will be achieved only if regulators correctly estimate the proper mix of 
incentive and access to copyright as needed to provide the optimal amount of innovation. 
See David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age: Computer 
Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 771, 773–74 (1996); Thomas F. Cotter, Intellectual Property and the Essential 
Facilities Doctrine, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 227–28 (1999). 
 11 See, e.g., Frank L Fine, European Community Compulsory Licensing Policy: Heresy 
versus Common Sense, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 619, 620 (2004) (describing “a stormy 
debate on both sides of the Atlantic as to whether compulsory licensing, on antitrust 
grounds, is an appropriate means of breaking monopolies that owe their existence, to a 
large extent, to the ownership of valuable intellectual property”); see also Alberto 
Heimler & Antonio Nicita, Intellectual Property Right-Based Monopolies and Ex-Post 
Competition: Some Reflections on the Essential Facilities Doctrine, at 26–28 (2000) 
(noting the growing number of cases involving IPRs and competition law). 
 12 Section 2 of the Sherman Act punishes, with a fine or by imprisonment or both, 
“monopolization” and “attempts to monopolize.”  Monopolization occurs when the 
owner wilfully acquires monopoly power in the relevant market
 
or maintains the power 
without any superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. See Intergraph Corp. 
v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  American antitrust treatment of 
monopolization cases in general tends to focus its attention exclusively on the market 
where the conduct under analysis displays its effects.
  
This means that the monopolization 
claim under § 2 will be framed (as monopolization or attempt to monopolize) pursuant to 
the degree of market power held by the company in the market that will be ultimately 
affected by the anticompetitive conduct.  Attempt to monopolize regards conduct that 
aims at achieving monopoly power in a certain market.  These are harder to prove 
because every firm tends to achieve a position of strength in the market.  Thus liability is 
found when there is proof of: 1) predatory or anticompetitive conduct, 2) a specific intent 
to monopolize, and 3) a dangerous probability of success. Spectrum Sports Inc. v. Shirley 
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1993); see, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Cutris V. Trinko, L.P., 540 U.S. 398 (2004); United States v. Terminal R.R. 
Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. CSU, LLC. v. 
Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support 
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. 
Publ’g, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 
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compel access where an owner unilaterally refuses to license.13  
Proof of such approach is evident in Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. 
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. (“Trinko”),
 
where the 
Supreme Court held that a company with monopoly power had no 
duty to open an infrastructural facility to its competitors because 
compelling it to share the source of its own advantage lessens the 
incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those 
economically beneficial facilities.14  This suggests that U.S. 
jurisprudence accepts the philosophy that markets are best placed 
to determine an efficient equilibrium. 
On May 1, 2002, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and 
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) conducted a round of hearings 
on single firm conduct with respect to refusals to deal.15  The 
discussion focused on views on the nature of IPRs compared to 
property rights, as well as on the conditions to rebut a 
presumptively valid justification for an owner to refuse access to 
its IPRs.  This was followed by another round of hearings on July 
18, 2006.16  This discussion focused on proposed tests, as well as 
 
 13 The locus classicus of this is Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1186–87, where the court 
held: 1) neither the antitrust nor IP legislation worked to erode the scope of other, 2) the 
limited copyright monopoly was based on Congress’ intent that the right to “exclude 
others from using their works creates a system of incentives that promotes consumer 
welfare in the long term by encouraging investment in the creation of desirable artistic 
and functional works of expression,” and 3) IPRs, although granted by the State, were not 
exempt from the application of antitrust law. See Emanuela Arezzo, Intellectual Property 
Rights at the Crossroad Between Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position: 
American and European Perspectives Compared, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. 
L. 455, 505 (2006) (noting that “the United States intends to protect competition by 
preserving a dominant firm’s incentives to compete and innovate; in order to do so, U.S. 
antitrust authorities think it is necessary not to force a dominant firm to deal or to license 
its competitors because they fear this might reduce its incentives to invest and compete to 
gain a monopolistic position”). 
 14 540 U.S. 398 (2004) [hereinafter Trinko]. 
 15 Participants in this session discussed “the extent to which refusals to license 
intellectual property create competitive concerns, how recent case law on refusals to 
license is being interpreted, and whether this recent case law appropriately balances the 
interests of intellectual property law and antitrust law.”  A list of the participants, as well 
as a transcript of the proceedings can be found at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ 
intellect/detailsandparticipants.htm#May%201 (last visited Oct. 12, 2007). 
 16 Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice Hearings, Federal Trade 
Commision, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/07/section2july.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 
2007). 
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on the competence of courts to determine harm to markets and 
consumers and to regulate the terms of access.  There was also 
recognition that economic analysis has not developed sufficiently 
to provide clear rules.17 
The E.U. has chosen a different approach to regulating 
innovation.  Influenced by the German ordoliberal school, it sees 
competition law as an instrument to ensure freedom of action and 
participation from all market players.18  It has developed tests to 
determine when an IPR owner exceeds the basis of IPRs granted to 
it.  An IP owner had the duty to license its IPRs where refusing 
access to indispensable proprietary content would stifle a new 
product from being offered in a related market for which there was 
real consumer demand.19  As economic theory was introduced into 
European competition analysis, its tests became more ambitious.  
Most recently in Commission of the European Communities v. 
Microsoft, the Commission was purportedly able to weigh the loss 
in incentives to the owner to innovate by providing access against 
an aggregate gain in incentives to innovation in the relevant 
 
 17 Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason, What to Do About Unilateral Refusals to License, Federal 
Trade Commision, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020501mackie2.pdf (“The optimal 
balance between innovation incentives and protection against static monopoly harm is not 
knowable to any reasonable degree of precision.  Economists may be able to identify 
some special cases in which the desired rule is unambiguously knowable, but these cases 
will be few.”). 
 18 The core principles and ideas of the ordoliberal school can be found in: DAVID 
GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE 241–46 (Oxford 
University Press, 2001) (1998).  In essence, ordoliberal theory focuses on the importance 
of a stable and transparent framework of rules for the efficient functioning of a private 
market economy, as embodied by the notion of “complete competition” in which no firm 
can engage in abuses of monopoly positions and other forms of coercion in a given 
market, emphasizing the need for the state to ensure that the free market produces results 
close to its theoretical potential.  Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty governing this area of 
European competition law provides a list of examples of abusive conduct,
 
but E.C. 
founders purposefully left both the concepts of dominance and of abuse to be further 
developed by the Court of Justice and Member State courts. See Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, art. 86, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter E.C. Treaty]  
This was similar to the Warren Court’s antitrust populist approach which focused on 
freedom of action but with concern focused on autonomy for small players in market. 
 19 Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743 at para. 2. 
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markets identified.20  At the time of this writing, the Court of First 
Instance has not pronounced on the substantive merits of the case. 
In December 2005, the European Commission initiated a 
public consultation to review the application of Article 82 of the 
E.C. Treaty to exclusionary abuses and treatment of refusals to 
license, followed by a public hearing on June 14, 2006.21  It 
adopted an effects-based analysis grounded on economic principles 
rather than per se prohibitions, which was roundly welcomed.22  
However, respondents were also concerned that an effects-based 
analysis would be hard to implement.23  There were numerous 
requests for clearer rules to assist businesses in self-assessments of 
lawful conduct,24 including “white areas.”25  DG Competition has 
indicated that IPRs and their effects will be carefully evaluated.26  
 
 20 Case C-3/37.792, Comm’n v. Microsoft, 2004 E.C.R. at para. 782.  Intriguingly, an 
observation has been made that “[t]he possibilities of even the US and EU to influence 
the behavior of the world’s biggest computer and software companies are limited.” 
MIKKO VÄLIMÄKI, THE RISE OF OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: A CHALLENGE TO THE USE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, 79 n.207 (Helsinki, ed., Turre 
Publishing 2005). 
 21 Exclusionary abuses refer to “behaviours by dominant firms which are likely to have 
a foreclosure effect on  the market . . . to actual or potential competitors and which 
ultimately harm consumers.” DG Competition Paper, supra note 4, at 4. 
 22 See, e.g,, Baker & McKenzie Response to DG Competition’s Article 82 
Consultation, 1 (Mar. 31, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/ 
art82/076.pdf (stating that “we welcome the proposal by DG Competition to adopt an 
effects based approach grounded on foreclosure analysis.  While we comment on how the 
Paper should be clarified and expanded, we agree with the broad thrust of the Paper in 
applying economic principles to Article 82”). 
 23 See, e.g., Common Position of Cercle de l’Industrie on Revision of the Application of 
Articles 82 EC Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses, para. 9 (Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter 
Common Position of Cercle], http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/ 
art82/008_en.pdf. 
 24 This is supported by DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY 162–66 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1981). 
 25 See Common Position of Cercle, supra note 23, at para. 28. 
 26 According to the DG Competition, it is “sufficient” that competitors are 
“disadvantaged and consequently compete less aggressively . . .” while E.U. 
“enforcement policy toward refusals to supply will take into account both the effect of 
having more short-run competition and the possible long-run effects on investment 
incentives” though less weight will be given to future efficiencies compared to present 
efficiencies. DG Competition Paper, supra at note 4, paras. 58, 213.  See also Arezzo, 
supra note 13, at 457 (asserting that “European antitrust law has endorsed a more 
restrictive attitude, holding that when exceptional circumstances do exist, the exclusive 
LIM_121307_FINAL 12/13/2007  9:57:01 PM 
298 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 18 
However, as in the U.S., a concern has also been expressed that 
economic theory in this area had not developed to an extent where 
the impact of such refusals can be sufficiently understood for 
regulators to intervene with confidence.27 
These actions of the Commission and the responses thereto are 
important and have contributed to an understanding of the 
Interface.  Nevertheless, beyond a rough measure, there are still 
difficulties in deciding when and whether it is right for mandatory 
access to be granted to IPRs.  Moreover, the approaches to solving 
this puzzle are likely to be heavily influenced by socio-economic 
infrastructures including fairly entrenched views about the role of 
capitalism and socialism.28  Solutions will not come easily and, 
even if forthcoming, might not be consistent in different 
jurisdictions. 
It will continue to be important to try to work out the test for 
dominance and with it, the role of IPRs in the antitrust and 
competition law context.  But, it is possible also that non-legal and 
non-traditional economic development will make it more likely 
that economic dominance will be less likely to occur in market 
situations.  This means that it is possible that collective social and 
economic activities without traditional economic incentives will 
make it more likely that competitiveness and consumer welfare 
will thrive in markets driven by IP products and services. 
Up to now the market, and together with it the propertisation of 
information, have become integral mechanisms to efficiently 
allocate scarce resources.  Economic rewards have been considered 
 
faculty of the IP-owner can be curtailed in favor of a more competitive structure of the 
market”). 
 27 See Public Hearing on Article 82 Before the European Comm’n (14 June 2006) 
(testimony of Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law Centre), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/en_42.wmv. 
 28 For example, the DOJ and FTC have adopted a decidedly more capitalistic approach, 
preferring not to disincentivize IP owners with vague and complicated rules.  In doing so, 
there is a risk that the state of innovation may reflect the reality of geopolitics that too 
much information will be controlled by the hands of a select few.  DG Competition has 
been influenced by a more socialist perspective of IP ownership, and a general distrust 
for broad IPRs.  Thus dominant IP owners are under a “special responsibility” not to 
distort the competitive structure, weakened by their presence, further by abusing their 
dominance. Commission Decision 98/531/EC, 1998 O.J. (246), para. 267. 
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necessary to promote the creation of artistic or inventive works.  
But there is evidence that the needs for those economic rewards are 
changing.  We know that some creativity such as cave drawings 
has been historically without the need for personal economic 
incentives.  But dissemination of creative works almost always 
required incentives and operate through a downward dissemination 
of information goods.  For some time, there has been evidence that 
at least some types of creativity and dissemination do not fit into 
this traditional mould.  Open source is perhaps the most well-
known example. 
The law has often lagged behind technology and economic 
changes.  The law of the Interface is no exception. Thus, while 
competition authorities in the U.S. and E.U.—both global leaders 
in IP and competition policy—apply themselves assiduously to the 
task of ironing out the analytics of abuses of dominant positions 
including the refusals to license,29 the world had moved  quietly 
and quickly forward. 
In 2006, Time Magazine selected “You” to be Person of the 
Year.30  It did so because it saw “collaboration on a scale never 
seen before . . . wresting power from the few and helping one 
another for nothing and how that will not only change the world, 
but also change the way the world changes.”31  Traditionally, the 
sunk costs of innovation and commoditization were generally high 
in nearly every commercially valuable IP market.32  IP markets are 
traditionally organized along national boundaries according to 
strict hierarchical lines of supply, and customers and consumers 
are confined to relatively limited economic roles—whether as 
passive consumers or corporate customers trapped beneath IP 
 
 29 See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
 30 Lev Grossman, Time’s Person of the Year: You, TIME, Dec. 13, 2006, available at  
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1569514,00.html. 
 31 Id. 
 32 DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION 
531 (Pearson 2005) (1990) (citing examples of investment outlays by major 
multinationals as a percentage of revenue: “In 2002, Microsoft (software) (invested) 
15.2%; Advanced Micro Devices, 30.3% (microprocessor chips); Biogen 
(biotechnology), 32%”). 
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owners in organizational hierarchies.33  Owners with substantial 
market power could exclude competitors by unilaterally refusing to 
license their proprietary content in primary or secondary markets.34  
Barriers to entry were high, and the risk of consumer harm could 
be great.  Antitrust analysis took place in these paradigmatic, 
vertical silos of innovation. 
While these vertical hierarchies remain, changes in technology 
are giving rise to new models of production based on collaboration 
and self-organization rather than on hierarchy and control.35  
Technology has “increase[d] access to information, and [brought] 
us closer to” an ideally “efficient, frictionless global market.”36  
Ordinary individuals have platforms to collaborate and share 
content at very little cost.37  Critically, it potentially reduces the 
reliance on dominant firms and markets to respectively create and 
trade the goods and services they desire, and with them the 
anticompetitive market effects of a refusal to license.38 
This new mode of innovation and value creation is called “peer 
production” or “wikinomics.”39  Peer production has reached a 
 
 33 IP exploitation is essentially based on two rights which have been codified in 
national legislation through the impetus of international treaties.  The first is the right to 
own and sell ideas.  The second is the right to control the use of those ideas after sale.  
These create vertical relationships which content protected by IP is traded on the 
marketplace for payment, whether in the form of a royalty or a license fee.  As an 
example, see Accenture Global Convergence Forum 2005: Plenary Session, available at 
http://www.accenture.com/Global/About_Accenture/Business_Events/By_Industry/Com
munications/DigitalMeet.htm (noting that “in the current value chain in the digital world 
we look for content creation to come from the media and entertainment industry, 
distribution from the communications and retail world, while end users are dependent on 
consumer electronics for delivery”). See also RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 734 
(Oxford Univeristy Press 2005) (1989) (“Generally speaking, intellectual property rights 
are the product of, and are protected by, national systems of law, although the growth of 
international commerce has resulted in an increasing measure of national cooperation.”). 
 34 See DG Competition Paper, supra note 4, at 67–69. 
 35 See generally TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS,  supra note 3. 
 36 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 237 (Farrar, Staus & Giroux 2006) (2005). 
 37 TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS,  supra note 3, at 12. 
38 FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 93–95. 
 39 The term “peer production” describes what happens when masses of people and 
firms collaborate openly to drive innovation and growth, and was coined by Professor 
Yochai Benkler in his 2003 paper, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm. 
See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE 
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tipping point where new forms of mass collaboration are changing 
the production and exploitation of IP.  Economies of scale and 
scope—which gave dominant undertakings a highly developed 
distribution network and wide geographical coverage—are 
vanishing.40  In other words, capacity constraints due to the 
prohibitive cost of sunk investments are becoming less important.  
The power to disseminate products and ideas rather than just 
passively consuming them fundamentally reshapes  the flow of 
innovation.41  Critically, it potentially reduces the reliance on 
dominant firms and markets to respectively create and trade the 
goods and services they desire, and with them, the anticompetitive 
market effects of a refusal to license.42  It follows that if there is an 
alternative system of innovation that creates more market players 
on a continuing basis, it should result in less dominance and, 
consequently, less need for intervention by competition authorities 
in IP markets. 
II. WIKINOMICS: ANOTHER WAY FORWARD? 
Peer production is emerging as an alternative model of 
innovation that harnesses human ingenuity efficiently and 
effectively. Two examples are open source43 and crowd-sourcing.44  
 
L.J. 369, 375 (2002).  The term “wikinomics” was coined by Don Tapscott and Anthony 
D. Williams. See generally TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3. 
 40 TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
 41 Michael Sandel observed that this phenomenon was first identified by Karl Max and 
Friedrich Engels in the Communist Manifesto, published in 1848.  While the shrinking 
and flattening of the world constitute a difference of degree from what they saw 
happening then, it is nevertheless part of the same historical trend they observed—the 
inexorable march of technology and capital to remove all barriers. See FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 36, at 234. 
 42 As Thomas Friedman put it, “communities of geeks are now collaborating to design 
new software and then to upload it to the world. . . . The genesis of the flat world 
platform not only enabled more people to author more content, and to collaborate on that 
content.  It also enabled them to upload files and globalize that content . . . without going 
through any of the traditional hierarchical organisations or institutions.” FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 36, at 93–94. 
 43 Wikipedia describes “open source” as “a set of principles and practices that promote 
open access to the design and production of goods and knowledge.  The term is most 
commonly applied to the source code of software that is made available to the general 
public with relaxed or non-existent intellectual property restrictions.  This allows users to 
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The collective knowledge, capability, and resources embodied 
within broad horizontal networks of participants can be mobilized 
to accomplish more than one firm acting alone.  More importantly, 
the ability to integrate the talents of dispersed individuals and 
organizations could potentially mitigate the anticompetitive effects 
of refusals to license by dominant undertakings.45  Indeed, it may 
reshape the strategies through which dominant undertakings 
exploit their IPRs, so that instead of refusing access, they actively 
seek out other stakeholders to in a new model of collaborative 
proprietary innovation.  It is important to clarify, however, that 
peer production does not merely encompass altruistic community 
efforts like those from the contributors of Wikipedia or some open 
source software projects.  As will be seen, peer production also 
offers a platform for commercially viable, sometimes highly 
successful, business models.46 
At least two factors made this possible.  First, in the 1990s, 
Windows-enabled computers made it possible for individuals to 
author their own content from their desktops in digital form.47  
With the steady advance of telecommunication, they were able to 
 
create software content through either incremental individual effort or through 
collaboration.” Open source, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 44 Wikipedia describes “crowd sourcing” as “a neologism for the act of taking a job 
traditionally performed by an employee or contractor, and outsources it to an undefined, 
generally large group of people in the form of an open call. . . .  In some cases the labor  
is well-compensated.  In other cases the only rewards may be kudos or intellectual 
satisfaction.  Crowdsourcing may produce solutions from amateurs or volunteers working 
in their spare time.” Crowdsourcing,Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Crowd_sourcing (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 45 As Thomas Friedman put it, “Everywhere you turn, hierarchies are being challenged 
from below or are transforming themselves from top-down structures into more 
horizontal and collaborative ones.  ‘Globalization’ . . . is not simply about how 
governments, business, and people communicate, not just about how organizations 
interact, but is about the emergence of completely new social, political, and business 
models. . . .  [T]here is something about the flattening of the world that is going to be 
qualitatively different from the great changes of previous eras: the speed and breadth with 
which it is taking hold.  The introduction of printing happened over a period of decades 
and for a long time only affected only a relatively small part of the planet. . . . This 
flattening process is happening at warp speed and directly or indirectly touching a lot 
more people on the planet at once.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 48–49. 
 46 See, for example, infra Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2. 
 47 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 54–55. 
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disseminate their own digital content in new ways to many more 
people.  At the same time, computers became cheaper and more 
available all around the world.  There was also an explosion of 
software that allowed work to be dissected, sent for remote 
development, and reassembled.48  People discovered that they 
could connect their computers to their telephones and emails 
through the Internet.  The diffusion of computer, faxes, Windows, 
and modems connected to a global telephone network came 
together in the 1990s to create a basic platform that started the 
global information revolution.49 
Second, the dotcom bubble that stimulated the overinvestment 
in fibre-optic cable communications allowed competitors and 
consumers to use networks to link to Internet services.50  Glass and 
radio waves are woven into intercontinental fibre-optic nerves that 
wire up disparate individual undertakings into a grand network.51  
Unlike the first generation of companies, companies today can 
plug-and-play because a lot of the essential infrastructure is free.52  
 
 48 See id. 
 49 See id. at 53.  From a geopolitical perspective, the opening up of China, India, and 
Eastern Europe coincided with the growth of the global communications platform.  There 
was nothing to stop the digital representation of everything—words, music, photos, data, 
and video—and the global exchange of all that digital information.  This coincidental 
breakthrough suddenly gave individuals both reach and scale—reach because they could 
create content in so many new and different ways, and scale because they could share 
their content with so many more people. See id. at 51–52. 
 50 The dot com bubble happened shortly after Netscape went public in 1995 and made 
the Internet accessible to everyone.  The more alive the Internet was, the more different 
people demanded computers, software, and telecommunications networks that could 
easily digitize words, music, data, and photos and transport them through the Internet to 
anyone else’s computer.  In that year, another catalytic event took place.  Windows ‘95 
was rolled out with a built-in browser that allowed all PC applications to interact with the 
Internet.  This set off an explosion in demand for all things digital and sparked the 
Internet boom, because everything was going to be digitized and transported and sold on 
the Internet.  Then the demand for Internet-based products and services would be infinite.  
As investors watched this mad rush to digitize, they realized that the demand for web 
service companies and fiber-optic cables to handle all the digital stuff was going to be 
limitless.  It sparked an overinvestment in fiber-optic cables which dramatically drove 
down the cost of making a phone call or transmitting data anywhere in the world.  And 
thus was the dot com bubble born. See id. at 57–66. 
 51 See id. at 66–69. 
 52 See id. at 181.  The ready availability of well-honed and free Linux software, the 
Apache Web server, the MySQL database, and the PHP and Perl scripting languages—
collectively known as the LAMP stack—means significantly lower capital investments. 
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The Internet significantly lowered entry barriers.  From this came a 
collaborative interface for wikinomics—a global, Web-enabled 
platform for multiple forms of collaboration. 
A. Schumpeter, Creative Destruction, and Wikinomics 
Underlying the trade-off between free competition and 
exclusive IPRs is Joseph Schumpeter’s theory that it may 
sometimes be necessary to forego static efficiency for greater gains 
in dynamic efficiency.53  Schumpeter described the process of 
“creative destruction” and the dynamics of innovation as the most 
important drivers of the competitive process.54  Technical progress 
makes market power a temporary phenomenon, more than 
compensating for static welfare losses.55  Further, without proper 
regard for incentives, the result of competition will be insufficient 
innovation.  It follows that since innovation is the engine that 
 
See LAMP (software bundle), Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LAMP_ 
(software_bundle) (last visited Oct. 7, 2007); see also Plug-and-play, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plug-and-play (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 53 Static efficiency occurs when firms compete within an existing technology to 
streamline their methods, cut costs, and drive the price of a product embodying that 
technology down to something close to the cost of unit production.  Static goals lead to a 
focus on short-run marginal cost, to the exclusion of long run efficient capital 
investments in research and development (“R&D”).  Static efficiency is a powerful force 
for increasing consumer welfare, but economists tell us that an even greater driver of 
consumer welfare is dynamic efficiency.  Dynamic efficiency refers to gains that result 
from entirely new ways of doing business. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 2d ed. 1947). 
 54 See id. at 82–85.  Creative destruction is describes the process of transformation that 
accompanies radical innovation.  In Schumpeter’s vision of capitalism, innovative entry 
by entrepreneurs was the force that sustained long-term economic growth, even as it 
destroyed the value of established companies that enjoyed some degree of monopoly 
power.  “Economists are at long last emerging from the stage at which price competition 
was all they saw.  As soon as quality competition and sales effort are admitted into the 
sacred precincts of theory, the price variable is ousted from its dominant position.  
However, it is still competition within a rigid pattern of invariant conditions, methods of 
production and forms of industrial organisation in particular, that practically monopolizes 
attention.  But in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that 
kind of competition which counts but competition from the new commodity, the new 
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organisation . . . —competition 
which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the 
margins of the profit and outputs of existing firms but at their foundations and their very 
lives.” Id. at 84. 
 55 See id. at 97 n.13. 
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powers competition and ensures consumer welfare, the goal of 
competition law should be to encourage broad IP protection to 
foster and support firms’ incentives to innovate.56  While 
Wikinomics might call into question to some extent Schumpeter’s 
view on the need for incentives for innovation, it might prove him 
right on the role of creative destruction.  In any case, Wikinomics 
has the potential to supercharge the process of “creative 
destruction” in at least some IP markets.  The most important 
question is whether Wikinomics will lead to a transformation of 
the competition-law landscape.  Below the question is asked in the 
context of some landmark cases and new factual scenarios. 
1. Microsoft 
In the E.U. Microsoft case, the Commission found that 
Microsoft was a “superdominant” undertaking which used its 
market power to exclude competition and destroy the incentive for 
competitors to innovate.57  It found that in the past, Microsoft 
competitors were deterred from introducing new application 
programs for the Microsoft workgroup server operating systems.58  
This is because if they now did not have interface protocols for 
Windows, their only market was Microsoft who might buy it and 
introduce it into the system.59  Moreover, the Commission did not 
disclose its interface information to competitors who could or had 
 
 56 Phillip Beutel, The Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Economics: A 
Schumpeterian View, in ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST: NEW ISSUES, QUESTIONS, AND 
INSIGHTS, 133, 133 (Lawrence Wu ed., 2004). 
 57 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Comm’n of the European Comtys. v. Microsoft Corp., 
2004 O.J. (L 32) para. 435 (“Microsoft, with its market shares of over 90%, occupies 
almost the whole market—it therefore approaches a position of complete monopoly, and 
can be said to hold an overwhelming dominant position.”).  It should be recognized from 
the onset that the Commission took great care in preparing its case against Microsoft, 
even subjecting the file to peer-review. VALENTINE KORAH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES 166 (Hart Publishing 2006). 
 58 Workgroup server operating systems be understood as software that manages the 
sharing of the resources of several computers within a linked network.  The operating 
system processes raw system data and user input, and responds by allocating and 
managing tasks and internal system resources as a service to users and programs of the 
system. See generally, WILLIAM STALLINGS, OPERATING SYSTEMS, INTERNALS AND 
DESIGN PRINCIPLES (Prentice Hill, 2005). 
 59 See Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Comm’n v. Microsoft, 2004 O.J. (L 32) paras. 453, 
779. 
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designed competing programs.  This locked consumers into 
Microsoft’s server market.60 
In an interim hearing, the Court of First Instance denied 
Microsoft’s request for a stay of the Commission’s fine of nearly 
€500 million, the largest ever imposed on a single firm.61  
However, what was perhaps more important to Microsoft is that 
the CFI also denied its request for a stay of the Commission’s 
order for Microsoft to disclose interface information on reasonable 
and non-discriminatory terms.62  Specifically, the Commission 
ordered Microsoft to disclose to competitors the interface 
specifications of the Windows workgroup server operating systems 
so as to enable them to achieve full interoperability with 
Microsoft’s desktop Windows operating systems.63  The 
Commission in Microsoft opined that since access to the source 
code was not being required, Microsoft’s fears of cloning were not 
justified.64  It followed that Microsoft’s incentives to innovate 
would not be affected.65  This order covers past, present, and future 
Microsoft products without any time limitation.66  This means that 
Microsoft must continually update this information as it brings to 
market new versions of its products.  This remedy has been 
criticized as extraordinary, both in terms of the significant loss in 
the strategic value of its copyright and trade secrets as but also the 
fact that competition authorities are involved in the first  
 
 60 See id. at para. 694.  It should be recognized from the onset that the Commission 
took great care in preparing its case against Microsoft, even subjecting the file to peer-
review. See KORAH, supra note 57, at166. 
 61 KORAH, supra note 57, at 150; see also Microsoft hit by record EU fine, CNN.com, 
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2004/BUSINESS/03/24/microsoft.eu/ (Mar. 25, 
2004). 
 62 KORAH, supra note 57, at 162. 
 63 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Comm’n v. Microsoft, 2004 O.J. (L 32) para. 999. 
 64 Id. at paras. 713–22. 
 65 Id. at para. 729.  But see KORAH, supra note 57, at 162 (saying that: “the incentive 
must have been considerably reduced”).  And if Microsoft’s cutback on R&D is anything 
to go by, Korah is probably right. Microsoft’s Annual Reports for 2000 and 2005, 
available at http://www.microsoft.com/msft/ar.mspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2007) (showing 
that Microsoft reduced R&D expenditures from $3.775 million in 2000 to $1.241 million 
in 2005). 
 66 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Comm’n v. Microsoft, 2004 O.J. (L 32) paras. 1000–03. 
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place in determining how much a company should disclose.67  This 
contrasts with the result in the U.S. DOJ antitrust action against 
Microsoft, where the DOJ made similar claims against but were 
only able to achieve more modest results.68  Microsoft’s conduct 
reduced the incentives of competitors and potential competitors to 
undertake R&D because “they know that Microsoft will be able to 
limit the rewards from any resulting innovation . . . .”69 
However, the theory that market power can be leveraged to 
significantly stifle innovation may now be questionable as an 
absolute rule.  Since the elimination of Netscape,70 Microsoft did 
not experience any real competition in the Web browser market.  
 
 67 See Ian S. Forrester, Article 82: Remedies in Search of Theories?, 28 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 919, 927, 931 (2005) (drawing a parallel with Syfait v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE, 
Case C-53/03, 2005 ECR I-4609 where “GSK, a pharmaceutical company, [was] under 
an affirmative duty to supply unlimited orders from wholesalers active in the trade of 
certain prescription drugs from low-price to high-priced Member States,” but 
distinguishing Microsoft because it goes further and represents the most expansive inroad 
of E.C. competition law enforcement into the protection of IPRs in Community legal 
history). 
 68 Essentially, the U.S. case revolved around the allegation that Microsoft had illegally 
tied its operating system to its Internet browser, thereby extending its monopoly power in 
both markets.  The DC Circuit Court of Appeals found that Microsoft prevented 
computer manufacturers from modifying or removing pre-bundled icons. See United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 202 (D.D.C. 2002).  In addition, the court 
found that Microsoft entered into agreements with Internet Access Providers and 
Independent Software Vendors to promote its browser exclusively, and also to use its 
Java Virtual Machine instead of Sun Microsystems’ Java programming. Id.  The trial 
ended in settlement, with Microsoft agreeing not to prohibit computer manufacturers and 
vendors from adding features that could divert users away from Microsoft products. Final 
Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200400/200457.htm.  The agreement also prohibits 
Microsoft from entering into exclusionary agreements with Internet Access Providers 
prohibiting the use of products that compete with Microsoft’s products. Id.  Microsoft 
also cannot discriminate against internet access providers, independent software vendors, 
and internet content providers who choose to use competing products. Id.  Finally, the 
agreement also stipulated that Microsoft disclose to Independent Software Vendors how 
its operating system interoperated with its middleware products. Id.  This allows 
competitors to use Windows for their own programs. Id.  In contrast, the E.U. 
investigations were more narrowly tailored to issues of server compatibility and the 
bundling of its media player software with its Windows operating system. See generally 
Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Comm’n v. Microsoft, 2004 O.J. (L 32). 
 69 Complaint at 12, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. 1998), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2007). 
 70 Mozilla, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozilla (last visited Oct. 5, 2007). 
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In 2004, Netscape was reborn as Firefox, an open-source Web 
browser.71  Firefox allows users to alter the code and create plug-
ins and customized “extensions” that can then be downloaded by 
any user.72  Web-surfers adopted Firefox rapidly, despite Internet 
Explorer coming pre-installed with every copy of Microsoft’s 
dominant Windows operating system.  And Firefox is a viable 
alternative to Windows Internet Explorer.73  Downloads have 
continued at an increasing rate; as of February 2007, Firefox had 
been downloaded over 300 million times.74  Internet Explorer has 
 
 71 “The Firefox project went through many versions before 1.0 was released on 
November 9, 2004.  In addition to stability and security fixes, the Mozilla Foundation 
released its first major update to Firefox 1.5 on November 29, 2005.  On October 24, 
2006, Mozilla released Firefox 2.  This version includes updates to the tabbed browsing 
environment, the extensions manager, the GUI, and the find, search and software update 
engines; a new session restore feature; inline spell checking; and an anti-phishing feature 
which was implemented by Google as an extension and later merged into the program 
itself.” See Mozilla Firefox, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firefox (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2007). 
 72 For example the Bugmenot feature allows users to bypass compulsory registration 
for sites such as the New York Times.  It automatically enters account details from its 
database, so that users do not have to go through the entire registration process. 
Bugmenot.com, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.bugmenot.com/faq.php (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
 73 In same year Firefox was introduced, Forbes called Firefox “the best Web browser.” 
Arik Hesseldahl, Better Browser Now The Best, FORBES, Sept. 29, 2004, available at  
http://www.forbes.com/2004/09/29/cx_ah_0929 tentech.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).  
PC World named Firefox the “Product of the Year” in 2005 on their “100 Best Products 
of 2005” list. PCWorld.com, The 100 Best Products of 2005, 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,120763-page,12/article.html (last visited Oct. 2, 
2007).  After the release of Firefox 2 and Internet Explorer 7 in 2006, PC World reviewed 
both and announced that Firefox was the better browser. Erik Larkin, Radically New IE 7 
or Updated Mozilla Firefox 2—Which Browser Is Better? PC WORLD, Oct. 24, 2006, 
available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,127309-pg,1-RSS,RSS/article.html (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2007).  A report in mid-2006 by OneStat stated that almost 13% of Internet 
users around the world now use Firefox, up from 8% in 2005. Melissa Tan, How to 
switch to Mozilla Firefox, STRAITS TIMES INTERACTIVE, Apr. 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.straitstimes.com. 
 74 Mozilla Firefox, supra note 71.  This number does not include downloads using 
software updates or from third-party websites.  They also do not represent a user count, 
as one download may be installed on many machines, or one person may download the 
software multiple times.  Mozilla Vice President of Products Christopher Beard estimates 
that Firefox had 70 million to 80 million users as of October 2006. Elizabeth Montalbano, 
Final Version of Mozilla Firefox 2 Available Today, PC WORLD, Oct. 24, 2006, available 
at http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,127603-c,mozilla/article.html (last visited Oct. 5, 
2007). 
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seen a steady decline of its usage share since Firefox’s release.75  
With Microsoft releasing version 7 of Internet Explorer (“IE7”) 
that same month, Firefox’s share growth might have been expected 
to slow, but IE7 has instead gained share mostly at the expense of 
older versions of IE.76 
What is perhaps more remarkable about Firefox is that two 
people in particular are most responsible for the browser’s success: 
a 19-year-old Stanford sophomore and 24-year old New Zealander 
working in an open-source community for free, starting from both 
ends of the world and without having ever met, produced a 
browser that took 15% of the browser market in about three 
years.77  This raises the question whether any analysis of 
Microsoft’s market power as a vertical silo of innovation would be 
accurate today without taking into consideration peer produced 
alternatives such as Firefox. 
2. Trinko 
In Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. 
Trinko, LLP., Verizon was the incumbent local exchange carrier 
(“ILEC”) in New York.78  The 1996 Telecommunications Act 
requires that ILECs sell unbundled parts of their local networks at 
cost to competitive local exchange carriers (“CLECs”), so that 
ILECs share their networks to give new competitors a toehold in 
 
 75 According to Dutch web analytics firm OneStat, by July 2006, Firefox was the 
second most widely-used browser, with 12.93% of global usage share, a percentage that 
has remained steady. OneStat.com, Mozilla Firefox Global Usage Share Remains Stable, 
http://www.onestat.com/html/aboutus_pressbox44-mozilla-firefox-has-slightly-
increased.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).  By December 2006, according to data made 
available by U.S. firm NetApplications, Firefox’s market share had grown to 14% 
globally. Gregg Keizer, Firefox Continues Growth, PC Chat, Jan. 17, 2007, 
http://www.pcchatshow.com /articles/showarticle.php?ArticleID=642. 
 76 Gregg Keizer, Despite 100 Million IE 7 Installs, Microsoft’s Browser Still Loses 
Ground, INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan. 16, 2007, available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=196901142 (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2007). 
 77 Int’l Monetary Fund, Transcript of an IMF Book Forum—The World Is Flat: A Brief 
History of the Twenty-First Century, Apr. 8, 2005, available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/tr/2005/tr050408bf.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
 78 540 U.S. 398, 401 (2004) [hereinafter Trinko]. 
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the market.79  The Federal Communications Commission asserted 
that Verizon breached its duty by inadequately providing access to 
the customers of its CLEC competitors, one of which is AT&T.80  
Trinko was an AT&T customer.81  Trinko alleged that Verizon 
discouraged customers from becoming or remaining customers of 
CLECs like AT&T, and claimed that Verizon’s breach of its duties 
under the Telecommunications Act to grant access to AT&T 
constituted an antitrust violation.82  While the Supreme Court 
ultimately found that Verizon had no duty to license,83 it again 
raises the question how the analysis of the case would have been 
altered when viewed through the lenses of wikinomics. 
 Since its inception, companies have charged for 
communications by telephones based on the length of time and 
distance across which the call was made.  However, this pricing 
scheme might not last much longer.  In 2003, Niklas Zennström 
and Janus Friss founders of the file sharing application Kazaa, 
launched Skype.84  Skype’s software harnesses the collective 
computing power of peers, allowing them to speak with each other 
free of charge via the Internet.85  Skype competes against existing 
open Voice over Internet protocol service (“VoIP”) providers.86  
 
 79 See id. 
 80 See id. at 403, 413. 
 81 Id. at 404. 
 82 See id. at 404–05. 
 83 See id. at 415–16. 
 84 Skype, http://www.skype.com; About Skype, http://about.skype.com/; Jeremy 
Caplan, Bringing TV to the Web, TIME, Mar. 1, 2007, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1595049,00.html (last visited Oct. 5, 
2007). 
 85 Skype Help, http://support.skype.com/?_a=knowledgebase&_j=subcat&_i=3 (follow 
link “What is Skype”). 
 86 VoIP allows consumers to make phone calls over the Internet by turning voices into 
data packets that are sent down Internet networks and converted back into voices on the 
other end.  Anyone who subscribes to the service through a phone company or private 
operator can receive unlimited local and long-distance phone calls, via the Internet—over 
his personal computer, laptop, or PDA—with just a small microphone attachment. See 
Federal Communications Commission Consumer Facts, Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP), http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ consumerfacts/voip.pdf (last visited on Oct. 5, 2007).  In 
contrast, “Skype operates on a peer-to-peer model, rather than the more traditional server-
client model.  The Skype user directory is entirely decentralised and distributed among 
the nodes in the network, which means the network can scale very easily to large 
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Skype’s business model creates a self-sustaining 
telecommunications system that requires no central capital 
investment.  Skype went from 100,000 to 100 million registered 
users in two years, and was acquired by eBay for US$2.0 billion in 
2005.87 
Today, “Skype claims that about 30% of Skype accounts are 
business accounts.”88  Internet communications in business reduce 
costs and increase productivity within a company.  It also promotes 
collaboration among a company’s different groups that may be 
located in different locations, and enhances the way a company 
communicates with its suppliers, vendors, and customers.  Skype’s 
broad feature set of voice and video calling, conference calling, 
instant messaging, and file transfer is applicable in many of these 
situations.89  At present, every business and personal phone call to 
anywhere in the world is as cheap as a local call.90  As consumers 
get more choices, the competition will be such that the negative 
effects of undertakings refusing access to CLECs like AT&T will 
be diluted.  “What phone companies will compete over, and charge 
for, will be the the add-ons.”91  While customers may not pay for 
calls, they will pay for premium services such as making calls to a 
landline network or for voice and video messaging. 
 
sizes . . . .” See Skype, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skype (last visited Oct. 5, 
2007). 
 87 Nate Mook, eBay Acquires Skype for $2.6 Billion, BetaNews.com, Sept. 12, 2005, 
http://www.betanews.com/ article/eBayAcquires_Skype_for_26_Billion/1126540985 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2007); see Tom Sanders, Skype Signs Up 100 Millionth User, 
Computing.co.uk, May 1, 2006, http://www.computing.co.uk/vnunet/news/2155074/ 
skype-signs-100-millionth-user (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).  In February 2007, Skype 
reported its 500 millionth user download. See Paul D. Kretkowski, Skype Roadmap 2007, 
VOIP NEWS, Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.voip-news.com/interviews/skype-qa-oberg-
022007/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2007). 
 88 See Kretkowski, supra note 87. 
 89 “Skype already has more than 50 leading hardware manufacturers producing more 
than 160 Skype Certified devices and accessories, including desktop Internet phones, 
cordless phones, headsets and WiFi phones.  In addition, Skype for Windows Mobile 
works on more than 120 different Pocket PC and Smartphone devices.  In fact, it has been 
downloaded more than 5 million times, making it one of the most popular Windows 
Mobile applications to date.” Id. 
 90 Voice Over IP, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voice_over_IP (last visited 
on Oct. 6, 2007). 
 91 Posting of Bill Binning to Jaduka blog, http://blog.jaduka.com/archives/34-Its-the-
Services,-Stupid!.html (Feb. 27, 2007, 8:41 EST) (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 36). 
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But even as peer-to-peer internet telephony wires consumers to 
anyone in the world with a phone, the causeways of information 
become ever wider.  The WiFi92 revolution allows consumers to 
use Skype on mobile devices.93  Yet even now, WiFi could be 
made obsolete by the presence of WiMax94 processors which will 
have the potential to cover a much greater range than WiFi—in the 
order of several kilometres.95  This means that our mobile 
communication lines may soon take place over peer-to-peer 
network providers like Skype rather than LECs.  But Skype is not 
without its potential antitrust controversies.  “Skype has been 
criticized over its use of a proprietary protocol, instead of an open 
standard . . . since this makes it much more difficult, if not 
impossible, for other developers to interact with Skype.96  Some 
have theorized that the decision was made to prevent competition 
over business with SkypeOut,”97 which “allows Skype users to call 
traditional telephone numbers, including mobile telephones, for a 
fee.”98  While this potentially raises access concerns of its own, the 
point remains that entry is free to all who can provide a new and 
better alternative to traditional LECs. 
 
 92 WiFi “is a set of product compatibility standards for wireless local area networks 
(“WLANs”) based on the IEEE 802.11 specifications. . . . Wi-Fi enables a person with a 
wireless-enabled computer or personal digital assistant (“PDA”) to connect to the Internet 
when in proximity of an access point.  The geographical region covered by one or several 
access points is called a hotspot.” Thefreelibrary.com, Wi-Fi, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Wi-Fi-a0163332784 (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).  
“[H]otspots only have an effective range of 300 metres.” James Brown, VNUNET, Mar. 
16, 2006, http://www.vnunet.com/computing/analysis/2152089/wifi-provide-answer. 
 93 Compare Accessories and Devices, http://skype.com/help/accessories/devices.html# 
wifiphone (last visited Oct. 12, 2007). 
 94 “WiMAX is an acronym that stands for Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave 
Access, a certification mark for products that pass conformity and interoperability tests 
for the IEEW 802.16 standards.  WiMAX is a standards-based wireless technology that 
provides high-throughput broadband connections over long distances.” Human Law 
Mediation: WiFi on the Rise, but WiMax Poised to Take Over, http://www.human-
law.org/humanlaw/2006/03/wifi_on_the_ris.html (Mar. 17, 2006). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Skype, Wikipedia, supra note 86. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
LIM_121307_FINAL 12/13/2007  9:57:01 PM 
2008] IP, PEER PRODUCTION & MARKET DOMINANCE 313 
3. Magill 
In Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Comm’n of the European 
Comtys (“Magill”), three broadcasting companies were dominant 
over the listings of its own programs.99  This dominance was 
achieved through questionable copyright protection granted in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland for TV listings.100  “When Magill 
started to publish comprehensive weekly listings for all three 
stations, each TV station successfully sued for copyright 
infringement.”101  Each station had refused to license its listing 
information to anyone.102  The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) 
found that the refusal to license “amounted to an abuse of a 
dominant position over the programme information.”103 
The copyright for the non-creative listing of facts allowed each 
station a monopoly over the use of those facts or lists.104  Under 
E.U. law, the Court of Justice cannot rule on the correctness of 
Member State copyright laws unless that Member State protection 
falls within the subject matter for an E.U. copyright directive.105  
Copyright in television listings had not been the subject of any 
E.U. directive.  But many people think that the Court of Justice 
viewed the British and Irish protection for television listings as 
suspect, and used a novel application of competition law to do 
indirectly what it could not do directly.106  The Court held that: 
 
 99 See Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Comm’n of the European 
Comtys., 1995 E.C.R. I-743 [hereinafter Magill]; KORAH, supra note 57, at 138. 
 100 Magill, 1995 E.C.R. I-743. 
 101 KORAH, supra note 57, at 138. 
 102 Id. at 139.  The stations had only provided programme information to daily 
newspapers on a limited basis. Magill, 1995 E.C.R. I-743 at para. 9. 
 103 KORAH, supra note 57, at 138. 
 104 Id. 
 105 As the ECJ in Magill noted, “In the absence of Community standardization or 
harmonization of laws, determination of the conditions and procedures for granting 
protection of an intellectual property right is admittedly a matter for national rules and the 
exclusive right of reproduction forms part of the author’s rights, with the result that 
refusal to grant a licence, even if it is the act of an undertaking holding a dominant 
position, cannot in itself constitute abuse of a dominant position.” Magill, 1995 E.C.R. I-
743 at para. 49 (citing judgment in Case C-238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 
1988 E.C.R. I-6211 at paras 7–8). 
 106 Duncan Curley, Balancing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law in a 
Dynamic, Knowledge-Based European Economy, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
DEBATE: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 220, (Edward 
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• The television stations were the only sources of 
the basic information,107 their refusal to supply 
this information prevented the appearance of a 
new product which the stations did not offer 
and for which there was constant consumer 
demand;108 
• There was no justification for the refusal;109 
and 
• The stations reserved to themselves the 
secondary market of weekly TV guides, by 
excluding all competition on that market.110 
Television stations, whether broadcast, cable, or satellite, need 
television listings to serve their consumers.  To the extent that a 
competitor wants to use those listing, the market would be defined 
again as the station’s TV listings.  If the listings were still 
protected by copyright, then stations would continue to have 
dominance even if peer production of video alternatives were 
rampant.  Thus, on the sui generis facts of Magill, the result would 
be the same. 
However, the potential role of peer production in the 
production of video products that can compete with traditional 
television shows is strong.  YouTube and similar sites promise to 
provide an Internet-based alternative to local television stations.111  
 
Elgar 2006) (noting that “(i)n consequence of the ruling in Magill and the particular facts 
of that case, there was much subsequent debate in the literature about whether 
‘exceptional circumstances’ might apply to force compulsory licensing of IPRs in 
circumstances where IPRs were thought to be undeserving of legal protection, without 
the requirement to demonstrate that other unilateral conduct as well”). 
 107 Magill, supra note 99, at para. 53. 
 108 Id. at para. 54. 
 109 Id. at para. 55. 
 110 Id. The European Court of Justice’s judgment was extremely vague. The precise 
scope of “exceptional circumstances” remains unknown even to this day.  Whether this 
was because of a shrew desire to preserve wiggle room to refine the conditions for access 
or otherwise will remain for all time, a matter for academic speculation. See KORAH, 
supra note 57, at 139. 
 111 According to Wikipedia, “YouTube is a popular video sharing website where users 
can upload, view, and share video clips.” YouTube, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Youtube (last visited Oct. 6, 2007) [hereinafter YouTube, 
Wikipedia].  “Videos can be rated, and the average rating and the number of times a 
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YouTube was started as an “angel-funded enterprise” in garage 
with an initial investment of US$3.5 million.112  In November 
2006, Google announced that it had reached a deal to acquire the 
company for US$1.65 billion in Google’s stock.113  “YouTube’s 
pre-eminence in the online video market is staggering.”114  While it 
has some copyrighted works uploaded in full without permission, 
its main attraction are the massive independently produced videos 
of members of the public, or excerpts chosen and edited by 
members of the public of copyrighted works.  This creative force 
has been unleashed and will be difficult to stop.  It has already 
created a huge audience that otherwise would most likely would be 
watching traditional television programs.  As the sophistication of 
these public creators increases, the product will improve.  We 
might see sophisticated shorts and, perhaps, full length programs 
that will cut sharply into the market share of traditional shows.115  
As a mark of its importance in setting the tone for the way media 
will be consumed in future, YouTube was named Time magazine’s 
 
video has been watched are both published.” YouTube, Simple English Wikipedia, 
http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/YouTube (last visited Oct. 11, 2007) [hereinafter 
YouTube, Simple Wikipedia].  The New York Times reported that Hollywood producers 
are already placing a full television series, “Quarterlife,” on MySpace, another free 
access community site. Michael Ciepley, Show Series to Originate on MySpace, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/13/business/ 
media/13quarterlife.html (describing the show as “a regular television series, made by 
network-caliber writers, directors and production crews”). 
 112 See YouTube, Wikipedia, supra note 111. 
 113 Google closes $A2b YouTube deal, REUTERS, Nov. 14, 2006, available at 
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Busness/Google-closes-A2b-YouTube-
deal/2006/11/14/1163266548827.html. 
 114 “According to a July 16, 2006 survey, 100 million clips are viewed daily on 
YouTube, with an additional 65,000 new videos uploaded per 24 hours.  The site has 
almost 20 million visitors each month, according to Nielsen/NetRatings; . . . [a]ccording 
to the website Hitswise.com[sic], YouTube commands up to 64% of the UK online video 
market.” Mysite.cc, http://www.mysite.cc/ (quoting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
YouTube) (last visited Oct. 11, 2007). See also USATODAY.com, YouTube Serves up 100 
Million Videos a Day Online, REUTERS, July 16, 2006, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-07-16-youtube-views_x.htm? (last viewed 
Oct. 6, 2007); YouTube, Wikipedia, supra note 111. 
 115 BBC Joins Forces with YouTube, ZDNet UK, REUTERS, Mar. 2, 2007, available at 
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/0,1000000097,39286149,00.htm (BBC director-general 
Mark Thompson noted that “[i]t’s essential that the BBC embraces new ways of reaching 
wider audiences with nonexclusive partnerships such as these . . .”). 
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“Invention of the Year” for 2006.116  With the emergence of digital 
video on demand,117 the need to rely on national broadcasters, and 
consequently, their indulgence in providing access to their 
television listings, will be obviated.  As long as this emerging trend 
of independent global network of content providers sustains itself, 
Magill-type cases will not likely re-emerge. 
4. FairPlay 
Apple developed the iPod, a portable music player, and iTunes, 
an online music store.118  Apple has sold more than three billion 
songs on iTunes,119 and accounted for 82% of legal downloads in 
the U.S. in May 2005.120  Apple has sold over 100 million iPods,121 
and has over 70% market share of all mp3 players.122  It agreed to 
provide FairPlay,123 its digital rights management (“DRM”) 
protection,124 to the big-four music companies in order to entice 
 
 116 Lev Grossman, Best Inventions 2006: Invention of the Year, TIME, Nov. 13, 2006, at 
62, available at http://www.time.com/time/2006/techguide/bestinventions/inventions/ 
youtube.html. 
 117 See Video on demand, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_on_demand  
(last visited Oct. 23, 2007). 
 118 Apple – iPod + iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 119 iTunes Store Tops Three Billion Songs, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/ 
07/31itunes.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2007). 
 120 MacDailyNews, Apple’s iTunes Music Store Passes 430 Million Downloads, Market 
Share Increases to 82-Percent in May, http://macdailynews.com/index.php/weblog/ 
comments/5967/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2007). 
 121 Apple Introduces New iPod Classic, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/09/ 
05classic.html (last visisted Oct. 6, 2007). 
 122 Phillip Cruz, U.S. Top Selling Computer Hardware for January 2007, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
conewsstory&refer=conews&tkr=AAPL:U.S.&sid=ap0bqJw2VpwI (last visited Oct. 6, 
2007). 
 123 FairPlay, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FairPlay (last visited Oct. 23, 
2007). 
 124 Digital rights management technologies attempt to control use of digital media by 
preventing access, copying or conversion to other formats. Digital rights management 
systems have received some international legal backing by implementation of the 1996 
WIPO Copyright Treaty. See http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2007).  Article 11 of the Treaty requires contracting parties to enact 
laws against DRM circumvention. Id.  The U.S. has implemented the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA), while Europe has implemented the Directive 2001/29/EC 
(directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society), which requires E.U. member states to implement legal protections 
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them to make their music content available on iTunes.  However, 
“Apple’s tight control over FairPlay” has prevented its users from 
playing files “bought from other online services.”125  It also 
prevents iTunes rivals from providing interoperable content.126  
The French enterprise Virgin Media accused Apple of abusing its 
dominance by refusing to license its FairPlay digital rights 
management system in France.127  It claimed that in order to be a 
viable provider of online music, it had to be able to sell to iPod 
users.128  This meant access to FairPlay. 
In November 2004, the French Competition Commission 
rejected the complaint.129  It first held that because the market was 
rapidly expanding, new competitors were entering, prices were 
decreasing, and functionalities increasing, present market share did 
not reflect actual market power.130  Second, it held that FairPlay 
was not indispensable.131  There were other uses of pay-per-song 
and several other music portable players on the market.  Finally, 
the DRM was easily circumvented by burning the song onto a 
compact disc, and ripping it into another format.132  In the U.S., a 
 
for technological prevention measures. See Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998, 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf; Council Directive 
2001/29/EC, para. 47, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC), OJ 2001 L167/10 (Westlaw).  
Wikipedia describes digital rights management as follows: “Digital rights management 
(DRM) is an umbrella term that refers to access control technologies used by publishers 
and other copyright holders to limit usage of digital media or devices.  It may also refer to 
restrictions associated with specific instances of digital works or devices.  To some 
extent, DRM overlaps with copy protection, but DRM is usually applied to creative 
media (music, films, etc.) whereas copy protection typically refers to software.” Digital 
rights management, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_rights_management 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2007). 
 125 Natali Helberger, Virgin Media versus iTunes, 2 INDICARE MONITOR 16, 16 (2005), 
available at http://www.indicare.org/tiki-read_article.php?articleID=150 (last visited Oct. 
2, 2007). 
 126 See id. 
 127 See id. at 17. 
 128 See id. 
 129 See Didier Deneuter, No Abuse of Market Dominance by Apple According to the 
French Competition Council, EUROJURIS INTERNATIONAL, Dec. 12, 2004, 
http://www.eurojuris.net/eng/article-detail.asp?ArticleId=206. 
 130 See Helberger, supra note 125, at 18. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See Terrence O’Brien, The New Weapon Against Online Music Theft?, SWITCHED, 
Aug. 20, 2007, http://www.switched.com/2007/08/20/a-new-weapon-aganst-online-
music-theft/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).  In March 2006, the “[French Senate passe[d] a 
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class action suit was brought against Apple in the U.S. District 
Court of Northern California.133  It was accused of leveraging its 
monopoly on the iTunes market to thwart competition in its iPod 
market.134 
Pandora and Last.fm are potential alternatives to the DRM 
protected music from iTunes.  These are essentially automated 
music recommendation and Internet radio services.135  “Users 
begin by entering a song or artist that they enjoy, and the service 
responds by playing selections that the program thinks are 
musically similar.”136  “Songs played are added to a log from 
which personal top artist/track bar charts and musical 
recommendations are calculated.”137 
Users are then able to provide feedback on the 
individual song choices . . . which the system takes 
into account for future selection.  Over 400 different 
musical attributes or genes are considered when 
selecting the next song.  These 400 attributes are 
combined into larger groups called focus traits.  
There are 2,000 focus traits.138 
 
watered[-]down DRM bill” forcing suppliers of DRMs to provide information necessary 
for interoperability. Marc Perton, French Senate Passes Watered Down DRM Bill, 
ENGADGET, May 11, 2006, http://www.engadget.com/2006/05/11/french-senate-passes-
waterd-down-drm-bill/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). 
 133 Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 134 See id. at 1094; see also Nancy Gohring, Apple faces US lawsuit over iTunes-iPod 
link, INFOWORLD, Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/01/02/ 
HNapplelawsuit_1.html (“Apple faces a lawsuit in the U.S. . . . over tying its iTunes 
music store to the iPod digital music player. . . .  The suit was filed by a user, Melanie 
Tucker, and seeks class-action status.  It alleges that Apple violates antitrust laws by 
refusing to allow music bought in its iTunes store to be played on any digital music 
player besides the iPod.  It also charges Apple with not making it clear to customers that 
music from the iTunes store and the iPod are incompatible with music and devices 
offered by other companies.  The suit asks that Apple be forbidden to continue to support 
the exclusive tie-in between iTunes and the iPod and that Apple pay damages to anyone 
who has bought an iPod or music from the iTunes store after April 28, 2003.”). 
 135 See Last.fm, http://www.last.fm (last visited Oct. 4, 2007); Pandora, 
http://pandora.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2007). 
 136 Pandora Users Groups at Last.fm, http://www.last.fm/group/Pandora+Users (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2007). 
 137 This is termed “automatic track logging scrobbling.” Last.FM, Wikipedia. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Last.fm (last visited Oct. 4, 2007). 
 138 See Pandora Users Groups, supra note 136. 
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These allow consumers to get the songs they want, as well as 
other similar samplings which they may enjoy for free anywhere 
and anytime they are connected to the Internet.  With increasing 
penetration of WiFi and WiMax, consumers listening are able to 
enjoy the selection and convenience of songs downloaded from 
iTunes while on the move in their cities without any 
anticompetitive concerns with respect to interoperability. 
B. The Competitive Process in a Collaborative World 
New low-cost collaborative infrastructures allow competitors 
and entrants to access markets in ways that only large corporations 
could manage in the past.  The information and tools are available 
with a small amount of capital—dominance has been 
downsized.139  Indeed, as a growing number of firms see the 
benefits of mass collaboration, this new way of organizing could 
eventually displace traditional corporate structures as the 
economy’s primary engine of wealth creation.  However, two 
issues should be resolved. First, it may be argued that evidence of 
change in the way IP markets operate is scanty.  This suggests that 
the examples cited earlier are isolated occurrences or that they may 
only have minimal impact on the market power and strategies of 
dominant undertakings.  Second, even if wikinomics could have a 
significant impact on analysis at the Interface, the business model 
 
 139 For example, for a fee, SalesForce.com gives small and medium enterprises 
(“SMEs”) access to a library of Web-based business applications, which can be tapped 
into online to run their businesses. See On-Demand CRM Applications, 
http://www.salesforce.com/products/appexchange-applications/ (last visited Oct. 3, 
2007).  These applications operate like traditional software programs and can handle a 
wide range of business tasks.  The big difference is that these management tools are 
stored remotely on the SalesForce.com platform.  Because they are delivered over the 
Internet and written in standard Web formats, they are accessible to anyone who has an 
Internet connection and are easily interoperable with any business.  Microsoft has taken 
notice.  The New York Times reported on 9 November 2005 that several Microsoft 
internal memos from senior executives suggested that “Microsoft must fundamentally 
alter its business or face being at a significant competitive disadvantage to a growing 
array of companies offering Internet services. . . .  [A few days later], Microsoft . . . 
announced that it would offer two new services—Windows Live and Office Live . . .” 
which are essentially Business Web versions of its more popular products. John Markoff, 
Internet Services Crucial, Microsoft Memos Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at C5, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/09/technology/09soft.html. 
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could upset the traditional IP mechanism of rewarding innovation 
through temporary exclusivity. 
1. Where Has Peer Production Succeeded Commercially? 
An argument may be validly raised that the impact of peer 
production on traditional dominance in the market is speculative.  
For example, open source has not seen significant success in 
personal computer desktop software so far.140  Market shares have 
not changed much.141  While there have been reliable open source 
software alternatives in major application software categories, it 
has proved difficult to gain any relevant market share from the 
dominating Microsoft products.142  The short answer is that 
changes in market behavior take time and happens in markets with 
suitable conditions. 
When computers were first introduced into offices, some 
expected a significant boost in productivity.143  However, Professor 
Paul David explained such a lag by pointing to a historical 
precedent.144  He noted that while the light bulb was invented in 
1879, it took several decades for electrification to permeate the 
industrial process.145  Only when there was a critical mass of 
experienced factory architects, electrical engineers, and managers 
who understood the complementarities among the production line 
did electrification really deliver a productivity breakthrough.146  In 
 
 140 Mikko Välimäki & Ville Oksanen, The Impact of Free and Open Source Licensing 
on Operating System Software Markets, 22 TELEMATICS AND INFORMATICS 97, 98 (2005). 
 141 “If one uses searches made on Google as an indicator, during June 2001 and October 
2003, a steady 1% of all searches came from computers using Linux as the operating 
system.  The market share of Mac OS has been around 3–4% while other non-Windows 
operating systems gaining another 4%.  The rest of Google queries, that is over 90%, 
were made from computers running Microsoft Windows.” Id. at 99 n.1. 
 142 MIKKO VÄLIMÄKI, THE RISE OF OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: A CHALLENGE TO THE USE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 19 (Fin. Turre Publ’g 2005), 
available at http://pub.turre.com/openbook_valimaki.pdf. 
 143 See Paul A. David, The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the 
Modern Productivity Paradox, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 355, 355 (1990).  The noted economist 
Robert Solow quipped that “[w]e see the computers everywhere but in the productivity 
statistics.” Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 356. 
 146 See id. at 358. 
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the same way, while the impact of wikinomics is already beginning 
to be felt, changes in antitrust analysis may only be present 
necessary in limited technology and telecommunications markets.  
It may take some years before there is a critical mass of business 
models based on peer collaboration for antitrust analysis as a 
whole to be altered significantly. 
Yet it is significant that wikinomics has already found a willing 
audience in the governmental IP framework.  The U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) will soon begin experimenting with 
a wikinomics approach to reviewing patent applications.147  The 
Community Patent Review project aims to create an online system 
for peer review of patents.148  “It will support a network of experts 
to advise the Patent Office on prior art as well as to assist with 
patentability determinations.”149  By using social software, such as 
social reputation, collaborative filtering and information 
visualization tools, this project aims to “make it easier to protect 
the inventor’s investment while safeguarding the marketplace of 
ideas.”150  While there remains a risk that the system could be 
gamed, an opaque patent review system would likely be more 
susceptible to abuse than one where a community of peers can 
review and rate each others comments on a given patent 
application in an open and transparent forum.151 
 
 147 Posting of Anthony D. Williams to Wikinomics: The Blog, A Wikinomics Approach 
to the Patent System, http://www.wikinomics.com/blog/index.php/2007/03/05/a-
wikinomics-approach-to-the-patent-system/ (Mar. 5, 2007, 19:26 EST). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id.  “The quality of patents has sharply decreased as underpaid and overwhelmed 
patent examiners struggle with a backlog of over 600,000 applications and growing.” Id.  
“Companies try to patent things that other people or companies will unintentionally 
infringe and then they wait for those companies to successfully bring products to the 
marketplace.” Id.  Undertakings who file these patents and extract license fees from 
successful businesses play the patent system like a lottery. Id. “The real danger is that 
these questionable patents will end up driving up the costs of innovation by generating an 
increasing number of lawsuits, or threatened lawsuits, that genuinely innovative 
companies cannot avoid.” Id.  The problem is so endemic in fields like software and 
electronics, “low-quality patents have become a serious drag on the technological and 
scientific progress that the patent system was designed to promote.” Id.  See also U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 2007–
2012 STRATEGIC PLAN 13 (2007) (“We believe that partnership with stakeholders is 
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But the progressive march of wikinomics is not without its 
opponents.  There are at least three reasons why it might be 
derailed.  First, intrinsic to peer production is a continuing supply 
of willing collaborators.  Many open source software collaborators 
are driven by a desire to counterbalance the dominance of software 
corporations such as Microsoft and the desire to be part of creating 
a better system.  Idealism alone limits the quality and quantity of 
alternatives available to consumers.  In order for peer production to 
become a fully sustainable alternative to current business models, 
it will need to incorporate elements of a structured system of 
financial rewards in the way forward thinking organizations such 
as Skype and P&G have done.152  Second, a large part by 
successful commercial models of peer collaboration relies in part 
of the use of copyrighted works.  The trend then hinges on whether 
the law will provide for continued use of these works in some 
fashion through doctrines such as fair use or whether copyright 
owners will succeed in seeking to curtail use of their works.  For 
instance, in March 2007, Viacom filed a $1 billion lawsuit against 
 
crucial to defining, in a collaborative manner, solutions that will benefit the entire IP 
system.  We also believe that such partnerships can offer keys to global IP solutions, as 
American inventors, entrepreneurs, and businesses have global issues to consider. As an 
example, in fiscal year 2006, the U.S.PTO cooperated with a private sector-led group that 
chose to focus on so-called ‘peer review’ as a possible means of improving the quality of 
patent application packages received by the USPTO.  Private sector-initiated and -led 
efforts may provide the USPTO with important data and feedback that will help us, as 
stewards of the public trust, improve patent, trademark, and other IP systems for the 
benefit of all.”) (emphasis added), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/com/strat2007/stratplan2007-2012.pdf. 
 152 Another successful model of peer production is Google. See David Post & Bradford 
C. Brown, On the Horizon: ‘Peer Production’ Promises to Leap in Importance, 
INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan. 2, 2002 (“Google . . . shows another side of peer production.  It 
has become, almost overnight, the gold standard for search engines.  What makes Google 
different from and better than other search engines is that it evaluates the usefulness of 
each of the billions of Web pages out there and the relevance of each page to a particular 
query by counting and analyzing the links leading into the page in question.  In other 
words, it lets the network do the hard work of ranking Web pages.  It’s as though 
everyone who builds a Web page and links to other pages is working for Google, helping 
it provide better service to its customers.”), available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=6500771. 
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YouTube and Google, alleging massive copyright infringement.153  
Viacom said in its complaint: 
YouTube’s brazen disregard of the intellectual-
property laws fundamentally threatens not just 
plaintiffs but the economic underpinnings of one of 
the most important sectors of the United States 
economy.154 
. . . . 
YouTube has deliberately chosen not to take 
reasonable precautions to deter the rampant 
infringement on its site . . . because YouTube 
directly profits from the availability of popular 
infringing works on its site, it has decided to shift 
the burden entirely onto copyright owners to 
monitor the YouTube site on a daily or hourly basis 
to detect infringing videos.155 
Third, the progressive march of wikinomics rests in large part 
on a presumption that the Internet remains affordable for the large 
body of collaborative creators.  Like the media industries, 
telecommunications firms “need to recoup their investments in 
maintaining and upgrading the telecommunications 
infrastructure.”156  Telecommunications firms may charge fees in 
exchange for giving faster service.  Users who are used to fast 
service might become disaffected with collaborative sites that are 
too slow.  Thus, those sites might lose both creators and viewers.  
On the other hand, the slower sites should have a market of people 
who cannot afford the faster service.  There is no reason to think 
that those who cannot afford the faster service will no longer 
participate in the collaborative creative process or view it. 
This tiered Internet with different levels of service has created 
a strong debate on the merits “net neutrality.”  Some have 
 
 153 Complaint, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1:2007cv02103 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
13, 2007), available at http://ngdaly.googlepages.com/ViacomvYouTube.pdf. 
 154 Id. at para. 2. 
 155 Id. at para. 6. 
 156 TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 273. 
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predicted very dire consequences.157  This structure underlying 
much of the technological progress we take for granted today may 
collapse and choke the lifeblood out of the current and future 
collaborative creative process afforded by cheap and ready access 
to technological infrastructure.158  If it does, society may have to 
turn to antitrust and competition law for a possible solution in the 
form of the essential facilities doctrine.159 
 
 157 Id.  As Don Tapscott and Anthony Williams dramatically put it, “[i]f Yahoo pays the 
freight, BellSouth users will find Yahoo’s search engine works faster and better than 
Google’s.  So, in effect, BellSouth becomes a gatekeeper for the types of services that 
thrive on the Internet. . . . This is not just a war against the open Internet; it’s a war 
against economic development, a war against competitiveness, and a war against 
innovation.  In short, it’s a war against the future.” Id. at 273.  In the wake of this 
statement, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has alleged that 
Google has deceived consumers by not differentiating between its organic search results 
and those which are being displayed because Google has received payment from an 
advertiser. See John Collins, Google Antitrust Case Opens in Australia, IRISH TIMES, 
Sept. 11, 2007, available at http://contentagenda.com/articleXml/ 
LN667905952.html?industryid=45174. 
 158 Here an irony may be observed.  The Internet was created to facilitate the transfer of 
information, offering a communications network that could potentially survive a nuclear 
war.  Yet it remains pitifully vulnerable to technological bottlenecks which could be put 
in place by service providers seeking to profit by auctioning information to the highest 
bidders. 
 159 The Essential Facilities Doctrine (“EFD”) grew out of cases where a vertically 
integrated owner had exclusive control over some facility, and used that control to gain 
advantage over competitors in an adjacent or downstream market. Herbert Hovenkamp et 
al., Unilateral Refusals to License, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 10 (2006).  It was 
first discussed in the U.S. in United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n, in which a set of 
railroads formed a joint venture owning a key bridge across the Mississippi River and 
excluded non-member competitors. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).  In the E.C., the EFD was first 
discussed in Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, where a port owner was prohibited from 
imposing competitive constraints on downstream customers. 1994 O.J. (L 15) 8 (1994).  
The doctrine has also surfaced in cases involving such “bottleneck” inputs as sports 
stadiums, warehouse spaces, and newspaper distribution systems.  However, recent cases 
have focused on technological knowledge for access to networks.  These include physical 
networks like electricity or telecommunications, where there are clear elements of natural 
monopoly and the presence of explicit regulation, as well as “virtual” networks. Richard 
N. Langlois, Technological Standards, Innovation, and Essential Facilities Toward a 
Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach 4–5 (U. Conn. Dep’t Econ., Working Paper No. 
1999-07, 1999), available at http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/1999-07.pdf. 
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2. Is Peer Production a Threat to the IP Mechanism of 
Rewarding Innovation Through Temporary Exclusivity? 
There is a view that “if innovators are not going to be 
financially rewarded, the incentive for path-breaking innovation 
will eventually dry up, as will the money for deep R & D that is 
required to drive [technological] progress.”160  To this concern two 
responses may be given.  First, peer production offers an open 
technological infrastructure.161  Most open source solutions like 
Linux provide the basic infrastructure on which software 
developers can build applications and businesses.162  It allows 
commercial entities to compete in areas to which they can add 
value without being inhibited by lack of access to basic 
technological infrastructure.  Competitors will still have to develop 
a unique product or service, and a unique way to apply technology 
to areas of core value.  This means competitors will still need 
proprietary insights, innovations and proprietary software tools to 
build unique products or services.  As a consequence, durable 
competitive advantages in R&D-intensive industries will still be 
rooted in the growth of deep domain-specific knowledge. 
IBM shows how IP can be treated like a mutual fund—a 
balanced portfolio of some protected and shared IP assets.163  “At a 
 
 160 FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 109.  For example, “Microsoft’s success in creating the 
standard PC operating system produced the bankroll that allowed Microsoft to spend 
billions of dollars on R & D to develop Microsoft Office, a whole suite of applications” 
that it can now sell for a few hundred dollars. Id.  As Craig Mundie, Microsoft’s Chief 
Research and Strategy Officer, put it: “The virtuous cycle of innovation, reward, 
reinvestment, and more innovation is what has driven all big breakthroughs in our 
industry.  The software business as we have known it is a scale economic business.  You 
spend a ton of money up front to develop a software product, and then the marginal cost 
of producing each one is very small, but if you sell a lot of them, you make back your 
investment and then plough profits back into developing the next generation.  But when 
you insist that you cannot charge for software, you can only give it away, you take the 
software business away from being a scale economic business.” Id. 
 161 Id. at 91 (“Commercial software companies have to start operating further up the 
[software] stack to differentiate themselves. . . . The open source community is basically 
focusing on infrastructure.”) (quoting Jack Messman, chairman of Novell, Inc.). 
 162 TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 91–92. See also Linux, 
http://www.linux.org. 
 163 Id. at 26, 120.  “For example starting in 1999, more than a dozen pharmaceutical 
firms abandoned their proprietary R&D projects to support open collaborations such as 
the SNP Consortium and the Alliance for Cellular Signaling.  Both projects aggregate 
LIM_121307_FINAL 12/13/2007  9:57:01 PM 
326 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 18 
time when reliability and trust were the big question marks 
surrounding Linux, IBM indemnified client risk.”164  “Because it 
was reliable and free, Linux became a useful operating system for 
computers hosting Web servers, and ultimately databases, and 
today many companies consider Linux an enterprise software 
keystone.”165  Linux offers a viable platform uniquely tailored to 
business needs for 20% of the cost of proprietary operating 
systems.166 
A company that was proprietary, insular, and 
vertically integrated fifteen years ago now partners 
extensively with the open source community and is 
considered a positive force for collaboration and 
openness.  IBM enjoys the goodwill of thousands of 
independent and corporate developers who are 
committed to the Linux vision and community 
growth. IBM’s partnering and collaboration with 
communities it does not directly control are 
strategic tools competitors have yet to master.167 
In doing so, IBM gained a viable alternative to the Windows 
server on Intel-based platforms.  Just as important, IBM has gained 
experience and knowledge in a vital new model of value creation.  
Today, Linux services and hardware represent billions of dollars in 
revenue.  IBM estimates it has saved nearly a billion dollars per 
year compared to what it would have to spend on creating and 
maintaining an operating system in-house.168  More than that, 
supporting open source has enabled IBM to undercut competitors 
who charge for proprietary operating system software.  Though 
Linux is free to use or modify, it has been embedded in all kinds of 
profitable products and services developed by large companies like 
 
genetic information culled from biomedical research in publicly accessible databases.  
They also use their shared infrastructures to harness resources and insights from the for-
profit and not-for-profit research worlds.  Nobody gives up their potential patent right 
over new end products, and by sharing some basic intellectual property the companies 
bring products to market more quickly.” Id. at 27. 
 164 Id. at 82. 
 165 Id. at 24. 
 166 Id. at 81. 
 167 Id. at 82. 
 168 See id. at 78. 
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BMW, IBM, Motorola, Philips, and Sony.169  Contributing to the 
commons is not altruism.  Rather, it promotes vibrant business 
ecosystems that harness a shared foundation of technology and 
knowledge to accelerate growth and innovation. 
But in-house innovation alone will not be enough to survive in 
a fast changing and intensely competitive economy.  The speed 
and complexity of change is such that no one firm can create all 
the innovations needed to compete in information technology, or in 
any other industry.  With a little time and effort, most technology 
can be invented around.  Firms that make the boundaries of 
innovation porous to peer collaboration have a better chance to 
outperform competitors that rely solely on internal resources and 
capabilities.  As Joel Cawley, head of IBM’s strategic planning 
unit, put it: 
What we are seeing in so many different fields . . . 
is that the next layers of technical innovation 
involve the intersection of very advanced 
specialities.  The cutting edge of technical 
innovation in every field is increasingly 
specialized. . . . Therefore to come up with any 
valuable new breakthrough, you have to be able to 
combine more and more of these increasingly 
granular specialties.  That is why collaboration is so 
important.170 
Between 2001 and 2006, the pace of innovation has doubled in 
the pharmaceutical industry alone.171  When Procter & Gamble 
(“P&G”) realized that its army of 7,500 researchers was no longer 
enough to sustain its lead, it sourced 50% of its new product and 
service ideas outside their payroll, including the InnoCentive 
 
 169 See id. at 65. 
 170 FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 439; see also TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 
297–98 n.6 (noting that “as global complexity increases so do the list of challenges we 
face that are unsolvable by individual organizations acting alone. . . . There is simply no 
end to the requirements or possibilities for innovation.  These complex problems demand 
cross-disciplinary and interorganizational solutions.  Even comparatively simple products 
are becoming more complex.  All of this complexity is fueling an increase in the 
requirement for openness and boundary-spanning collaborations”). 
 171 See TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 13. 
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network.172  Ninety thousand scientists around the world are 
collaborating “to solve tough R&D problems for a cash reward.”173  
P&G thus posts “R&D problems on the InnoCentive Web site, 
while ‘solvers’ submit their solutions in a bid to capture cash 
prizes ranging from $5,000 to $100,000.”174  In 2006, “more than 
35% of [P&G’s] products in market ha[d] elements that originated 
from outside P&G . . . .  And 45% of the initiatives in [its] product 
development portfolio ha[d] key elements that were discovered 
externally.”175  At P&G, R&D productivity had increased by 
nearly 60%, while “R&D investment as a percentage of sales [wa]s 
down from 4.8% in 2000 to 3.4% . . . “ in 2006.176  “Five years 
after the company’s stock collapse[d] in 2000, [it] . . . doubled 
[it’s] share price and ha[d] a portfolio of 22 billion-dollar 
brands.”177  This shows that our increasingly complex and 
interconnected world has made wikinomics not merely be an 
intriguing alternative to current models of IP exploitation, but their 
evolutionary successor. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In today’s IP markets, the war between stakeholders will be 
less over prices and output as it will be over the ownership and 
access to information.  In this regard, it is important to recognize 
that protection and expansion of IPRs are means of serving a wider 
social purpose of promoting innovation, rather than satisfying an 
economic end in themselves.  Properly conceived, they are tools 
for preserving and enhancing a system of free enterprise and free 
competition.  Nevertheless, IPRs improperly constructed or applied 
 
 172 Id. InnoCentive is an open innovation company that takes research and development 
problems in the sciences, frames them as challenge problems, and opens them up for 
anyone to solve them.  They give cash awards for the best solutions to scientists who 
meet the challenge criteria. See David Wessel, Prizes for Solutions to Problems Play 
Valuable Role in Innovation, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Jan. 25, 2007, available at 
http://webreprints.djreprints.com/1657770067525.html. 
 173 TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 13. 
 174 Id. at 98–99. 
 175 Larry Huston & Nabil Sakkab, Connect and Develop: Inside Procter & Gamble’s 
New Model for Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2006, at 58 para. 15. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
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may cumulatively yield unacceptably high social costs by 
compromising the competitive process.  As Don Tapscott and 
Anthony D. Williams put it: 
Of course, as authors and business people we 
recognize that rewarding creativity and investment 
is central to promoting innovation.  In theory, 
intellectual property law exists to do just that.  But 
expansion in the law’s breadth, scope, and term 
over the last thirty years has resulted in an 
intellectual property regime that is radically out of 
line with modern technological, economic, and 
social realities.  This threatens the chain of 
creativity and innovation on which we (and future 
generations) depend. 
In today’s economy we need an intellectual 
property system that rewards invention and 
encourages openness—one that fuels private 
enterprise and sustains the public domain.178 
If the legal incentives provided by IPRs stimulate the first-
comer’s investments at the expense of second comers who wish to 
make investments on follow-on applications, IP laws would have 
traded one kind of market failure for another.  This is the fear 
competition authorities have. 
However, wikinomics and the conditions that facilitate it are 
ushering us toward a world where knowledge, market power, and 
productive capability will be more dispersed than at any time in 
our history—a world where innovation will be fast, fluid, and 
persistently disruptive.  Dominant undertakings which fail to grasp 
this will find themselves cut off from collaborative networks that 
are sharing, adapting, and updating knowledge to create value.  But 
the idea of monopoly power being broken by individual effort is 
hardly new.  The Roman Catholic Church had long been a 
predominant source of biblical knowledge.179  Then, in 1522, 
Martin Luther translated the New Testament from Greek to 
 
 178 TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 179. 
 179 See THE DICTIONARY OF BIBLE AND RELIGION, Bible Versions, 134, 135 (William H. 
Gentz ed., 1986). 
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vernacular, and suddenly, the common man had access to the Holy 
Scriptures.180  This catalysed a huge incentive to read and find out 
spiritual truths for themselves, and it in turn created the impetus 
toward the development of the printing press.181 
As Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams observed, 
wikinomics 
works best when at least three conditions are 
present: 1) [t]he object of production is information 
or culture, which keeps the cost of participation low 
for contributors; 2) [t]asks can be chunked out into 
bite-size pieces that individuals can contribute in 
small increments and independently of other 
producers. . . . .  This makes their overall 
investment of time and energy minimal in relation 
to the benefits they receive in return.  And, finally, 
3) [t]he costs of integrating those pieces into a 
finished end product, including the leadership and 
quality-control mechanisms, must be low.182 
Collaborative networks will grow as they are free.  Switching 
costs are overcome by people who have a strong reason to do so.  
When innovators give consumers a new way of connecting, they 
will punch through any technical barrier.  However, this may take 
several years.  Significant shifts in market share take time, as there 
needs to be a critical mass for market tipping to occur. 
While wikinomics has not yet generated sufficient examples to 
justify an overhaul competition analytics in refusals to license 
cases, the point remains that some competitors and entrants now 
have easy access to business tools that only large undertakings 
could afford a few years ago and is setting the stage for a 
revolutionary change in the balance of power.  This should be 
taken into account in the analysis of the anticompetitive potential 
of a refusal to license.  As wikinomics penetrates the production 
and sale of IP products and barriers to entry are lowered, it may 
 
 180 See THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, Biblical Literature, Macropædia Volume 
14, at 916 (15th ed. 1994). 
 181 See id. 
 182 TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 70. 
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become increasingly more difficult to succeed in a complaint of 
abuse of dominance or monopolization.  As competition becomes 
increasingly globalized, vague and interventionist competition 
laws will repel investors who can move their businesses offshore 
on short notice.  In doing so, they will take with them invaluable 
technology which will give national economies a much needed 
edge.183  When the dust settles, a new legal architecture may 
emerge that is better suited to vastly different economic realities of 
information, and to the technology upon which it subsists. 
 
 183 See KORAH, supra note 57, at 172 (“I remain concerned that the EC position is in 
many ways stricter than that in the U.S..  This may encourage firms to perform their 
R&D and produce the results outside the Common Market, exporting the products to the 
Common Market.  This avoids the wider scope of Article 82 and the special 
responsibility of dominant firms to give access to essential facilities.”).  A recent 
reminder of this came from a South Korean competition case against Microsoft.  
Microsoft threatened to withdraw its Windows operating system from the Republic when 
its national competition authority imposed an order requiring Microsoft to remove code 
or redesign Windows uniquely for the Korean market.  For reasons known best to itself, 
Microsoft later decided otherwise. See South Korea Fines Microsoft $32m, BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4505698.stm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007). 
